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Essay
"Interpretation" of "Due Process of
Law"--A Study in Irrelevance of
Legislative History
B. ABBOTT GOLDBERG*
Legislative history may not be the bulwark of statutory interpretation
that some believe. In this introductory article, the author demonstrates
that fact by tracing the history of the concept of "dueprocess of law."
When some students at the McGeorge Center for Legislative Re-
search asked me to discuss the use of legislative history, I immediately
thought of the quip, "only when legislative history is doubtful do you
go to the statute."' Then, more seriously, I thought of Justice Frank-
furter's "threefold imperative to law students: (1) Read the statute; (2)
read the statute; (3) read the statute"2 and his admonition, "The notion
that because the words of the statute are plain, its meaning is also plain,
* B.A. Michigan; LL.B. Harvard. Judge of the Superior Court of California, Retired.
Scholar in Residence, McGeorge School of Law. The author thanks Miss Margaret Dailey, a
member of the second year class, for her research and editorial assistance during the summer and
fall of 1980.
1. Frankfurter, Some Reflection on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLuM. L. REv. 527, 543
(1947) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter].
2. H. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 202
(1967).
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is merely pernicious oversimplification." 3 To demonstrate these truths,
by what I naively thought would be a familiar example, I selected the
words "due process of law" which, while not statutory and having little
legislative history as such, have enough history to demonstrate that reli-
ance on history to persuade a court to reach a predictable result is to
"lean on a slender reed."'4 The history of "due process of law" is that
the courts have used history only when it, or part of it, could be used to
reach results the courts found just at the time of decision. The courts
are controlled by their perception of current community values, not by
history.
APPLYING CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION TO "DUE PROCESS OF LAW"
I began with an exercise: read "due process of law" literally; and
then invoke only the ordinary canons of construction while alert to the
dangers of using the canons as if they were binding rules. I did not
know that a similar experiment had been tried some seventy years ear-
lier7 and so I unwittingly merely reproduced its results: the words "due
process of law" do not of themselves necessarily state a limitation on or
a purpose to limit legislative power.
Although this conclusion is neither novel nor remarkable, it aston-
ished the students. And when I tried to relate it to Justice Black's refer-
ences to "natural law due process"8 their expressions varied from
incredulity to distaste. Therefore, I have attempted a simple explana-
tion I hope will help them to understand and enjoy some of the recent
literature on judicial review.9
"Due" means that which is "owing by right of circumstances or con-
dition; that which ought to be given or rendered; proper to be con-
ferred, granted or inflicted; . . . merited, appropriate, proper, right."' 0
The problem is not the meaning of the word but who is to decide what
3. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
5. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE].
6. "iThere are two opposing canons on almost every point." Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about how Statutes are to be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn]. "[These rules of construction are
not in any true sense rules of law. So far as valid, they are what Mr. Justice Holmes called them,
axioms of experience." Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 544.
7. Reeder, The Due Process Clauses and "The Substance of Individual Rights," 58 U. PA. L.
REv. 191 (1910).
8. g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 381 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U.S. 479, 515-17 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
9. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) [hereinafter cited as Gov-
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY]; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Grey]. I think the
answer to Grey's question is "Yes, but we don't admit it."
10. OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 813 (1971) (definition number six of "due").
1981 / "Interpretation" of "Due Process of Law"
is "merited, appropriate, right" in the circumstances, or in the language
of Morrisey v. Brewer, "what process is due."" The Supreme Court
has decided for itself that it is to make the decision according to "fun-
damental principles to be ascertained from time to time by judicial ac-
tion," imprecise but "immutable principles of justice which inhere in
the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard."' 2 It long ago rejected the proposition that the legislature
could make any process "due," ie., that the purpose of the clause was
simply to guard against unrestrained executive or judicial action.' 3 But
whoever makes the decision, it is clear that the word "due" has been
used as a descriptive generality rather than a precise definition. Indeed
the Court has used it as a license to avoid definition: "[t]he very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation."' 4 But all it means is "appro-
priate."
"Process," since it is a noun rather than an adjective, has a more
tangible meaning than "due." Its primary dictionary definition is "the
mandate, summons or writ by which a person or thing is brought into
court for litigation."' 5 But "process" also can be defined as "the whole
of the proceedings in any action at law; the course or method of carry-
ing on an action."' 6 Taking the fifth amendment as an example, one
could conclude that the primary narrow meaning of "writ" rather than
the broader secondary definition of "the whole proceeding" was in-
tended. One of the canons of construction is "The same language used
repeatedly in the same connection is presumed to bear the same mean-
ing throughout the statute."' 7 The sixth amendment refers to "compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses," obviously a reference to a writ.
On the face of the amendments there is no reason for assigning differ-
ent definitions to the same word used in both.
Another canon is "[e]very word and clause must be given effect" and
not treated as surplusage.' If "process" in the fifth amendment were
11. 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
12. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101-02 (1908); oerruled on other grounds, Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
13. Murray v. Hoboken, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856).
14. Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978).
15. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2311 (1971) (definition mamber seven of "process"). The
technical definition is virtually identical. 3 BouviER LAW DICTIONARY 2731 (8th ed. 1914).
16. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2311 (1971).
17. Llewellyn, supra note 6, at 404. Although "[t]here is no rule of interpretive law which
requires the same meaning to be given to the same word when used in different places in the same
statute," Anderson v. Los Angeles, 30 Cal. App. 3d 219, 224, 106 Cal. Rptr. 299, 302 (1973), '[ilt
seems unlikely that the Legislature would have used the same word in such close juxtaposition
with such widely different meanings," Bady v. Detwiler, 127 Cal. App. 2d 321, 326, 273 P.2d 941,
945 (1954).
18. Llewellyn, supra note 6, at 404.
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given the more extensive meaning, it would make other parts of itself
and the sixth, seventh, and eighth amendments redundant.' 9 Thus, a
proper inference is that the specific definition of "writ" rather than the
general meaning of trial procedure was intended.
Now apply the canon "[s]tatutes are to be read in the light of the
common law, and a statute affirming a common law rule is to be con-
strued in accordance with the common law."20 The words "due process
of law" can be traced at least as far back as the statute of 28 Edward
III, chapter 3 (1354), which provided that no man be put out of his
land, taken, imprisoned, or put to death, i e., deprived of life, liberty, or
property, "without being brought in answer by due process of the
law.' Since the statute of 28 Edward III was adopted before the set-
tlement of the colonies and not unsuited to their conditions, it could be
"deemed to have entered into the .fabric of the [American] common
law."' 22 Take Blackstone as an example of the common law usage with-
out ascribing to him any particular influence on the drafters of the
amendment. He wrote that in both civil and criminal cases "process"
meant the means of compelling the defendant to appear.23 When it was
repeated in the fifth amendment, it presumably meant only "that the
appropriate writ to be used to summon the accused. . . [and] that judg-
ment was not to be given against a man in his absence. '24
Finally, the canon, noscitur a sociis, that the statute is to be known
from its fellows and read in context,25 leads to the conclusion that the
due process clause was intended to be no more than procedural, be-
cause the fifth amendment consists, with one exception, solely of proce-
dural provisions and is located with other procedural amendments. The
exception is the compensation clause, which is substantive. Why the
compensation clause appears in the fifth amendment is something of a
mystery. St. George Tucker, "the American Blackstone," said that it
was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive modes
frequently employed during the American Revolution to obtain sup-
plies without compensation.26 A rationalization of its location is that it
19. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884) ("due process" in fourteenth amendment
does not include indictment by grand jury in fifth amendment).
20. Llewellyn, supra note 6, at 401.
21. Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process ofLaw, 19
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 266 (1975).
22. Beers v. Hotchkiss, 256 N.Y. 41, 54, 175 N.E. 506, 510 (1931). See also Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908).
23. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 279 (1768); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 313
(1769).
24. Jurow, Untimel, Thoughts: 4 Reconsideration ofthe Origins fDue Process o/Law, 19
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 267 (1975).
25. Frankfurter, supra note I, at 538.
26. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, App. 305-06 (St. G. Tucker ed. 1803). For a
discussion on the life of St. George Tucker, see A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 268-
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distinguishes takings for public use from takings to punish.2 7 Whatever
the explanation, it is clear that "due process of law" did not of its own
force require compensation, for otherwise the compensation clause
would have been unnecessary. Yet in what has been called "the first
real 'incorporation' case,"28 the court said, "it is not due process of law
if provision be not made for compensation."2 9
"Of law" would seem to mean any law, either common or statutory,
which does not violate any other provision of the Constitution. But
Daniel Webster argued "[e]verything which may pass under the form
of an enactment is not. . . to be considered law of the land. ' 30 And
this argument has been accepted:
The article [fifth amendment] is a restraint on the legislative as well
as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and can-
not be so construed as to leave Congress free to make any process
"due process of law" by its mere will.
31
"It is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is something
more than mere will exerted as an act of power. '32 And so we know
that all laws are not "law" within the meaning of the constitutional
language. But what laws are "law" within its meaning we do not know
until the Court tells us. Here the Court slides from "due process of
law" to "natural justice" 33 lubricating the way by refusing to define
"due process."
"Due process of law," read literally means appropriate writ author-
ized by any law. But this literal meaning is so far removed from com-
mon experience as to now seem absurd, and the attempt to apply the
"plain meaning rule" 34 to these words is a "pernicious oversimplifica-
tion." The words are now "spacious language" 35 of "convenient vague-
ness." 36 In reaching this result, the words in the Constitution have
71(1968) [hereinafter cited as HOWARD]. "[Tihe legislative history of the compensation clause is
quite unilluminating .... " B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 7
(1977). See also id. at 192-93, nn.10-13.
27. Reeder, The Due Process Clauses and the "Substance of Individual Rights," 58 U. PA. L.
REV. 191, 212 (1910).
28. HOWARD, supra note 26, at 339.
29. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
30. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819). Contra, Mayo v.
Wilson, 1 N.H. 53 (1817); Patrick v. Commissioners, 7 S.C. (4 McCord) 541 (1828).
31. Murray v. Hoboken, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856).
32. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
33. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 9, at 257; Pound, The Scope and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591, 593, 609 n.62 (1911).
34. Reference to the "plain meaning rule" is not an implication that it is necessarily a sure
guide. See H. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, BENCHMARKS 205
(1967).
35. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
36. See Hough, Due Process of Law.-To-day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218 (1919) [hereinafter cited
as Hough]. But see GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 9, at 193, 258.
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played a minor role; the lawyers and courts have not relied on the text
to find the content of the principles applied to invalidate legislation.37
They have, in the apt words of Professor Grey, employed a "noninter-
pretive mode."' 38 The words are now "a large generality which has
gathered meaning from experience."
But who made it a large generality? Not they [the draftsmen who
were our political ancestors]. We did. When they put it into the fifth
amendment, its meaning was as fixed and definite as the common
law could make a phrase. It had been chiseled into the law so inci-
sively that any lawyer, and few others, could read and understand. It
meant a procedural process, which could be ascertained from almost
any law book. We turned the legal phrase into common speech and
raised its meaning into the similitude of justice itself.
39
Of course the words "due process of law", if taken in their literal
meaning, have no application to this case [jurisdiction to tax in-
tangibles]; [but] it is too late to deny that they have been given a
much more extended and artificial signification.
41
"The 14th Amendment is a roguish thing."4'
To understand how the meaning of the words "due process of law"
evolved from a clear expression into a term deserving Holmes' epithet,
rogue, "a worthless fellow who sometimes preys extensively upon the
community by fraud,"42 and to understand how we turned it into "a
large generality," one must resort to history.
MAGNA CARTA AS A SOURCE OF "DUE PROCESS"
The history must start no later than 1215 because Lord Coke gave
"due process" "an ancestry emerging into script in Magna Charta. ' '43
Coke's authority was accepted in Murray v. Hoboken," the first case
interpreting the due process clause of the fifth amendment,45 and is re-
37. "Due process... precludes defining." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J.). "[Tihere is wisdom ... in the ascertaining of the intent and application of such
an important phrase ... by the gradual process ofjudicial inclusion and exclusion." Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
38. Grey, supra note 9, at 707. Grey's terminology seems to be catching on. See J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 n.l (1980). But see Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 n.l (1980).
39. Curtis, ReView andMajArity Rule, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 177 (E. Calm
ed. 1954).
40. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETrERS 267-68 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
41. 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 137 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
42. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 791 (1966) (sub. Knave).
43. Hough, supra note 36, at 218.
44. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856); see Hough, supra note 36, at 222-23. Reliance on
Coke to equate Magna Carta and due process was old hat even in 1856. See Mayo v. Wilson, I
N.H. 53,55 (1817); 5. Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 161, 7 Am. Dec. 526, 528 (N.Y. 1816); 2
J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 10 (1827).
45. 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 350-51 (rev. ed. 1926).
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spectable to this day.46 Coke wrote that the words nisiper legum terrae
("unless by the law of the land"), in Magna Carta were equivalent to
the words "without due process of law" in the statute of 37 Edward III,
chapter 8 (1363), and citing the statute of 28 Edward III, chapter 3
(1354) in the margin, equivalent to "due process of the common law."
47
In the sense that no change in present judicial treatment of due process
will result from a historical study, Judge Hough was correct when he
wrote "it is now as idle to cavil or complain. . . over Coke's historical
accuracy or lack of it, in respect of Magna Charta," and "[flor present
purposes it makes no difference whether Coke was right or wrong in
identifying due process with the law of the land."'4 But history is rele-
vant to illustrate Justice Frankfurter's point: "Some words are con-
fined to their history; some are starting points for history. . . Like
currency, words sometimes appreciate or depreciate in value."'49 His-
tory demonstrates this process regardless of the result.
To attempt to unravel Magna Carta is to plunge into "[a] gulf
profound. . . where whole armies have sunk," the Serbonian Bog of
Paradise Lost."° Little is clear about it, not even why it is called
Magna. Coke said it was so called "not that it is great in quantity...
Warren said that Murray was the first interpretation since 1819 and cited Bank of Columbia v.
Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819). Okely could have involved the fifth amendment, but the
court treated the case under the seventh amendment. Cf. Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rihts?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140, 163 n.42 (1949).
46. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 593 (1980).
47. Coke commented on chapter 29 of the-statute of 9 Henry 3 (1225) rather than on the
original version, chapter 39 of the charter signed by John in 1215. The 1225 version is the stan-
dard form, and chapter 39 of John's origina 63 chapters or chapter 29 of Henry the Third's 37
chapters, as the case may be, is one of the four chapters still left on the statute-book. See A.
PALLISTER, MAGNA CARTA THE HERITAGE OF LIBERTY 89 (1971) [hereinafter cited as PAL-
LISTER]; A. GOODHART, "LAw OF THE LAND" 13, 37 (1966) [hereinafter cited as GOODHART]; W.
McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 154-55 (2d ed. 1914) [hereinafter cited as MCKECHNIE]; M.
ASHLEY, MAGNA CARTA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 6-7 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
ASHLEY]. Coke's comment, with his marginal notes inserted in brackets, follows:
"Nisi per Legem Terrae. But by the Law of the Land. For the true sense and exposition
of these words, see the Statute of 37. E. 3. cap. 8 where the words, by the law of the
Land, are rendered, without due process of Law, for there it is said, though it be con-
tained in the great Charter, that no man be taken, imprisoned, or put out of his free-hold
without process of the Law; that is, by indictment, or presentment of good and lawfull
men, where such deed be done in due manner, or by writ originall of the Common law.
[25.E.3.cap.4.]
"[28.E.3.cap.3.] Without being brought in to answere but by due Process of the Com-
mon law.
"[37.E.3.cap.8.] No man be put to answer without presentment before Justices, or
thing of record, or by due process, or by writ originall, according to the old law of the
land.
"[42.E.3.cap.3.] Wherein it is to be observed, that this Chapter is but declaratory of
the old law of England. Rot. Parliament 42 E.3.nu.22.23 the case of Sir John A. Lee, the
Steward of the Kings house."
2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 50 (1642).
48. Hough, supra note 36, at 224, 228.
49. Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 537-38.
50. J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST, bk. 2, lines 592-94. The textual obscurity of the charter is
not a recent discovery. See I J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 624 n.l (Lee. XXIV) (10th ed. 1860).
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but in respect of the great importance, and weightinesse of the mat-
ter."'" And he gave the quaint analogy of Alexander the Great so
called "not in respect of the largenesse of his body, for he was a little
man, but in respect of the greatnesse of his heroicall spirit. . . .So as
of this Great Charter. ... 5 But more recent scholars say that it was
called "Great" in the material sense to distinguish it from a small char-
ter orparva carta granted by Henry III in 1237.53 Its contemporaries
usually called it Carta Baronum 54 the charter of the barons, a sugges-
tion of its reactionary features. Indeed the orthodox view of Magna
Carta as a landmark of constitutional progress has been called a myth
attributable to the "somewhat undigested learning and. . . powerful if
somewhat unscrupulous intellect" of Lord Coke.55
There is conflict as to its translation. The Charter provides that "[n]o
freeman shall be taken. . . nor will we not pass upon him. . . nisi per
legale.judicium parium suorum, yelper legem terrae.' ' 56 Does the word
vel mean "and" or "or"? In medieval Latin vel is sometimes
equivalent to et.s7 The historians are in splendid disagreement.5 8 Pol-
lock and Maitland cut the Gordian knot by giving vel the meaning
"and/or", and this circumlocution has been accepted by very reliable
authorities.59
Even where the translation is clear, there is doubt as to the thought
intended to be conveyed. To what doesper legem terrae, by the law of
the land, refer? It may mean "law of the land" in the popular sense, or
it may mean a mode of trial, e.g., wager of law or compurgation, battle
or ordeal.6" Judiciumparium suorum, the judgment of his peers, did not
mean trial by jury in any way resembling a modem trial6' but "that the
51. See 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES §108, 81 (1628).
52. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES, Proeme (unpaged) (1642); see I Id. §108 at 81 (1628).
53. See ASHLEY, supra note 47, at 6; GOODHART, supra note 47, at 37; MCKECHNIE, supra
note 47, at 120.
54. See McKECHNIE, supra note 47, at 120.
55. Jenks, The Myth ofMagna Carta, 4 INDEPENDENT REv. 260, 272 (1904). Edward Jenks
was a formidable legal historian. See Jenks, The Development of Teutonic Law, I SELECT ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 34 n.2 (1907). "Magna Charta was reconstructed, almost
invented, by Coke." C. MACDOUGALL, HOAXES 161 (Dover reprint 1958).
56. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 45 (1642); 6 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 404 (3d ed.
1969).
57. McKECHNIE, supra note 47, at 381.
58. Using "or": Murray v. Hoboken, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,276 (1856); 6 HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND 404 (3d ed. 1969); PALLISTER, supra note 47, at 117; Hough, supra note 36, at
218. Using "and": A. HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA TEXT AND COMMENTARY 14, 43 (1964), ac-
knowledging but not discussing the dispute, Id. at 32; HOWARD, supra note 26, at 388; MC-
KECHNIE, supra note 47, at 381-82; MeIlwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta, 14 COLUM. L.
REv. 27, 49-50 (1914) [hereinafter cited as Mcllwain].
59. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 29; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 61
(7th ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH].
60. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 22; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 60; Mcllwain, supra
note 58, at 47.
61. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 59-60.
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jury of peers, ie., of equals, determined whether the party should be
put to his proof in one of the established ways: ordeal by hot iron or by
water, compurgation, wager of law, trial by battle or production of
charter."' 2 "Few mistakes have been more important or more benefi-
cent than this [equating fudicium parium with trial by jury] in their
practical results. But a mistake it is. .. ."63 And if the phrase is read
in its original sense, it is not improbable that lex terrae meant only the
old modes of trial, that vel meant "and", and that this clause of Magna
Carta "is wholly reactionary, and has no sort of constitutional signifi-
cance."64 So read, Magna Carta assured the barons they would not be
tried by royal judges and recognitors who were not their peers;65 it was
a step backward rather than forward. "[T]he Barons compelled John to
sign Magna Charta, which said. . . [t]hat the Barons should not be
tried except by a special jury of other Barons who would under-
stand."66
Another view is that legem terrae has its "vague popular significa-
tion ' 67 and that vel means "or", a view taken because the words legem
terrae were from the Assize of Novel Disseisin of 1166. One might be
properly disseised by a verdict in such an assize without a medial judg-
ment of his peers, and there were other instances such as arrests of
felonsflagrante delicto and outlawry where the law of the land did not
require a judgment of peers.68 Conversely there were instances when
the law of the land did require a judgment of one's peers, and such
instances are said to have been the rule. This is the reason for conclud-
ing that vel "according to the circumstances may be construed as 'and'
or as 'or.
But "[tlhis uncertainty of the phrase [per legem terrae] has proved of
value in practice because its vagueness has made it possible to ascribe
to Magna Carta various meanings."7 Although Magna Carta was by
62. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 19-20; "the peers determine how the trial is to be con-
ducted .. " See generally J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 198-99 (1898).
63. McIlwain, supra note 58, at 44.
64. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 61; Sf. McKECHNIE, supra note 47, at 133 n.l;
The constitutional fathers regarded Magna Carta as having been from the first a muni-
ment of English liberties, but the view of it adopted by modem scholarship is a decidedly
different one. This is that Magna Carta was to begin with a royal grant to a limited class
of beneficiaries, and more or less at the expense of the realm at large.
Corwin, The "HigherLaw"Background ofAmerican Constitutional Law, (pt. 1), 42 HARV. L. REV.
149, 175 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Corwin I].
65. HOLDSWORTH, sufpra note 59, at 59-60; see GOODHART, supra note 47, at 22.
66. W. SELLAR & R. YEATMAN, 1066 AND ALL THAT 26 (Dutton ed. n.d.).
67. Mcllwain, supra note 58, at 46; McKECHNIE, supra note 47 at 380.
68. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 18. "The common law.., was in its origins the law of'the
land'--that is, of realty. Between approximately 1400 and 1600, it became the law of 'the land,' of
the country .. " M. TIGAR & M. LEVY, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 218 (1977).
69. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 62; see GOODHART, supra note 47, at 29.
70. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 23.
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any interpretation at least in part reactionary, it became the "'palla-
dium' of British liberties when men [were] no longer able to understand
its real meaning."'71 The words "nisiper legalejudicium parium suorum
yelper legem terrae" were worshipped "because it was possible to mis-
understand them."72 Magna Carta and its principal, expositor, Lord
Coke, became and have remained objects of esteem, if not veneration,73
thereby proving the accuracy of Professor Goodhart's observation, "It
is not always recognized that some of the most valuable parts of the law
can be attributed to errors in history or logic."' 74 "The fact is, Lord
Coke had no authority for what he states, but I am afraid we should get
rid of a good deal of what is considered law in Westminster Hall, if
what Lord Coke says without authority is not law."
7
"The great importance of Magna Carta was that it introduced a...
theory of law under which the king could be legally bound. . .[by] 'the
law of the land'," a law not dependent on the king's command but
"developed through the common custom of the realm."'76  In the
United States this restriction on the authority of the king was trans-
formed into a restriction on all "the powers of government, unre-
strained by the established principles of private rights and distributive
justice. ' 77 The how and why of the transformation of a restriction on
what we now call the executive to include the legislative and judicial
branches78 is as much an account of politics, philosophy, and religion
as it is of law. Although the materials emphasized here are legal, the
law is most likely the manifestation of the combined effects of the other
elements rather than the cause of the result.
Magna Carta was reissued nearly sixty times until about 1420, but it
was substantially unused for the next 150 years79 and "seems to have
been largely forgotten or overlooked in Tudor times."8 Its transmuta-
tion into a symbol of political liberty was due to Lord Coke not in his
capacity as a judge but as a commentator and member of Parliament,
71. Mcllwain, supra note 58, at 46. See also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 544
(Harlan, J., dissenting); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 349-50 (1769).
72. 1 E. POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 173 n.3 (2d ed. 1898).
73. Eg., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 593, (1980); North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 346
(1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
74. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 22.
75. Garland v. Jekyll, 130 Eng. Rep. 311, 320 (C.P. 1824).
76. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 27.
77. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 244. See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1878);
Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
78. "[T]he provisions of Magna Carta were incorporated into Bills of Rights. They were
limitations upon all the powers of government, legislative as well as executive and judicial."
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1884).
79. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 41.
80. ASHLEY, supra note 47, at 7.
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and to his political allies and friends."1
Its revival was not without birth pangs. The Levellers, a group of
radicals who wanted greater rights, denigrated it as a "'messe of pot-
tage' compared with the universal law of equity." 2 Sir John Keeling,
Chief Justice of the King's Bench, wanted to ignore it and, in words
perhaps intended to reflect the volatile properties of early seventeenth
century soup but which are "too coarse for modem manners," dispar-
aged it as "Magna Farta", an indecorum also attributed to Oliver
Cromwell. 3 But Coke called it the Charta libertatum Regni, 4 and ex-
tolled it
[a]s the goldfiner will not out of the dust, threds, or shreds of gold, let
passe the least crum, in respect of the excellency of the metall: so
ought not the learned reader to let passe any syllable of this Law, in
respect of the excellency of the matter.
8 5
Coke's view was the one that was destined to prevail in the United
States.
.BONHAM'S CASE AND THE AMERICAN INSTITUTION
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In the United States, Coke's influence is based on his legal writings
as well as his political efforts. "Coke [was] widely recognized by the
American Colonists 'as the greatest authority of his time on the law of
England'."8 6 His opinion in Bonham's Case87 has been described per-
haps with some exaggeration as a dictum whereby "he furnished a
form of words which, treated apart from his other ideas, as it was des-
tined to be by a series of judges, commentators, and attorneys became
the most important single source of the notion of judicial review."8
"The opinion was the common law's locus classicus on judicial review
• . . ,9 to which "[a]ll the law and doctrine upon that topic goes back
finally."90 "The literature on Bonham's Case is voluminous, repeti-
81. ASHLEY, supra note 47, at 4-5; e.g., S. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEv-
ANCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH," 1621-1628, at 122, 230 (1979) [hereinafter cited as WHITE].
82. ASHLEY, supra note 47, at 40-41; PALLISTER, supra note 47, at 18, 22.
83. ASHLEY, supra note 47, at 46 n.82, 48-49; PALLISTER, supra note 47, at 24, 29-30.
84. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES Proeme (unpaged) (1642).
85. Id. at 57. See also Prohibitions del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1607).
86. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1980).
87. 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1608), 646 (C.P. 1609) (Coke's own report); sub nom College of
Physician's Case, 123 Eng. Rep., 628 (C.P. 1609) (Brownlow's report).
88. Corwin, The "HigherLaw"Backgroundof,4merican ConstitutionalLaw (pt. 2), 42 HARv.
L. REV. 365, 379 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Corwin II].
89. M. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASES 358 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SMITH]; see
also 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 941 (1953) [hereinafter cited as CRoss-
KEY].
90. Corwin, The Establishment ofJudicialReview, 9 MICH. L. REv. 102, 104 (1910). On Bon-
ham'r relation to judicial review of administrative action as distinguished from review of validity
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tious"' 1 and, to a degree, conflicting. Much of it tries to validate the
American institution of judicial review by invoking Bonham's Case as
its historical precedent,92 a doubtful proposition. I have seen but one
that disentangles the separate and more readily supported proposition
that Bonham's Case is a source of the "noninterpretive mode" of per-
forming the function of judicial review, i e., the employment of extra-
constitutional standards to exercise that function.93
Thomas Bonham, M.D., graduate of Cambridge University, failed
the examination of the Royal College of Physicians but practiced
medicine in London nevertheless. He thus violated the charter of the
College granted by Henry VIII and confirmed by Parliament. The Col-
lege, acting under the charter, fined him and imprisoned him when he
continued to practice and failed to pay the fine. This was unexcep-
tional because Lord Coke had himself reported a recent case holding
"to every fine imprisonment is incident."94 But on his release Bonham
brought an action for false imprisonment against the officers of the Col-
lege and thereby raised a problem at the root of the case that has, so far
as I have found, not been stated with primer simplicity: was the Col-
lege a court of record?
Coke had also reported that courts not of record could not impose a
fine or commit any to prison95 and that judges of courts not of record
could be sued for false judgments if they acted without jurisdiction or
of legisiation, see Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARV. L. REV.
953, 953-59 (1957).
91. Thorne, The Constitution and the Courts: A Reexamination of the Famous Case of Dr.
Bonham, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 15 n.1 (C. Read ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
Thorne] cites several references. For other references, see J. Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings to
1901, 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 92 n.190 (P. Freund ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Goebel]. See also 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 118-28 (L. Wroth & H.
Zobel eds. 1965); 1 B. BAILYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 412, 718 nn.7-11
(1965) [hereinafter cited as BAILYN]; J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH HISTORY 32
(1955) [hereinafter cited as GOUGH]; Berger, Doctor Bonham's Case: Statutory Construction or
Constitutional Theory?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bonham]; Grey, Origins
of the Unwritten Constitution.- Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 843, 854-56 (1978); Kaufman, The Essence of Judciallndependence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671,
674-76, 692 (1980). For an effort to consider the case in its medical rather than constitutional
aspects see Goldberg, Horseshoers, Doctors and Judges and the Law on Medical Competence, 9
PAC. L.J. 107, 123-29 (1978). The definitive explication is A DISCOURSE UPON THE ExPoslclON &
UNDERSTANDING OF STATUTES 85-92 (S. Thorne ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as DISCOURSE].
92. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 221 (14th ed.
1978); Smith, Marbury v. Madison, Lord Coke, and Dr. Bonham: Relics of the Past, Guidelinesfor
the Present-Judicial Review in Transition, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 255, 261 (1979); Grey,
Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
STAN. L. REV. 843, 855-56 (1978).
93. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 40-41, at 294 n.93 (1980). The two separate prob-
lems are squinted at in Smith, Dr. Bonham's Case and the Modern Significance of Lord Coke's
Influence, 41 WASH. L. REV. 297, 313-14 (1966) and Boudin, Lord Coke andtheAmerican Doctrine
of Judicial Power, 6 N.Y.U.L. REV. 223, 223-24, 242 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Boudin].
94. Beecher's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 559, 564 (Exch. 1608).
95. Griesley's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 530, 535 (C.P. 1588).
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abused their jurisdiction.96 Thus the question in Bonham's Case was
whether the charter had constituted the College of Physicians as a court
of record. Lord Coke, before whom Bonham had the immediate good
fortune to come, held "that neither the letters patent [the charter] nor
the Act of Parliament has granted them any Court, but only an author-
ity;" 97 "they are not made judges," 98 and so could not impose a fine.
Furthermore, the College had not made a proper record. "[T]heir pro-
ceedings ought not to be by parol,"99 and "they cannot impose a fine, or
imprisonment without a record of it."'" Since the College was not a
court, nor were its officers judges, and they had not made a proper
record, the rule of judicial immunity protecting superior judges from
suit for acts in their judicial capacity did not apply, and Bonham had
stated a cause of action. In Coke's terms Bonham's commitment was
"traversable in an action of false imprisonment."' 0'°
Bonham 's Case invites an antiquarian spree,' °2 but its immediate in-
terest is why Coke held that the College was not a court that could
impose a fine but had only "an authority" to collect a fine "which is to
be recovered by the law,""' 3 ie., by an ordinary action in a proper
court. He gave five reasons, only the fourth of which is here material.
The charter and the act divided the fine for unlicensed practice "one
moiety to the King, and the other moiety to the president and the col-
lege."' If the College could by proceedings before its own members
impose a fine for its own use, they would be judges in their own case
96. Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (Star Chamber 1608); see Case of the Marshal-
sea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1038-41 (C.P. 1612); 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
234-37 (2d ed. 1937); Thorne, Courts of Record and Sir Edward Coke, 2 U. TORONTO L.J. 24, 35,
43-44 (1937). This type of problem still arises. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359
(1978) (immunity of judges); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-73 (1959) (immunity of executive
officials).
97. 77 Eng. Rep. at 655.
98. Id. at 657.
99. Id. at 656.
100. Id. at 657.
101. Id.
102. Bonham complained that the College had committed him to the "Compter, London in
the Poultry," also known as the Counter, a debtors prison, where he was "evilly treated ... there
so in prison for a long time, that is to say, by the space of seven days." Id. at 638, 645. He was
released by the King's Bench for reasons not now discoverable. 1 G. CLARK, A HISTORY OF THE
ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON 269 (1964). Although Coke's most popular biogra-
pher described the case as "piddling almost farcical," C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 309
(1957), it may have seemed less so to Bonham. Prisons then were places where "the stench and
steam is intolerable and. . . [t]he very walls are covered with lice .... ; 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 182 n.7 (1938), and debtors prisons were particularly rigorous for the
"debtor had to live at his own expense, charity or die of starvation," 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 323-33 (1937). Coke himself described the Counter as "a strait person"
and noted the collusive "shift (in deceit of the Court)" whereby some prisoners obtained removals
to the less stringent Fleet Prison. 2 E. COKE, INSTITuTEs 215 1 e (1642), the use of a warrant duel
facias "by the common people called a horse." The Case of Captain C., 86 Eng. Rep. 167 (K.B.
1673); 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 227 (1937).
103. 77 Eng. Rep. at 657.
104. Id. at 651.
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"which is absurd."' 5 Coke's words in his own report are:
4. The censors [of the College of Physicians] cannot be judges,
ministers, and parties; judges to give sentence and judgment; minis-
ters to make summons; and parties to have the moiety of the forfei-
ture .. .and one cannot be Judge and attorney for any of the
parties. . . . And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the
common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes ad-
judge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to
be void.1
0 6
These words have resulted in a small library of scholarly contro-
versy. Are they dictum or, as Coke himself termed them, an alternative
basis of his opinion?'1 7  More important, are they, as Plucknett be-
lieved, "words which challenged both Crown and Parliament"' 08 (an
anticipation of judicial supremacy as we now know it) or, as Thorne
has explained, an "argument derived from the ordinary common-law
rules of statutory interpretation" that repugnancies or contradictions
are to be avoided and the repugnant words to be omitted? "There is no
constitutional problem raised here, but only one of statutory construc-
tion."1
09
Coke was concerned only with the application of a statute that led to
results "encounter common droit & reason", not with the theory that
"an Act of Parliament would be void from its first Creation" because
of a conflict between its provisions and fundamental, natural or
"higher" law. "1
0
Eminent recent historians have accepted Thorne's view as correct,"'
105. 123 Eng. Rep. at 933.
106. 77 En&. Rep. at 652. The language in Brownlow's report is essentially similar:
[Tihe president and college cannot . . . bring their action before themselves . . . but
ought to have their action. . . for otherwise the penalty being given, the one moiety to
them, and the other to the King, they shall be judges in propria causa, and shall be
summoners, sheriffs, judges and parties also; which is absurd . . . if any statutes, are
made against law and right, and so are these which makes any man judge in his own
cause . . . this is a void statute, for it is impertinent [impossible?) to be observed.
123 Eng. Rep. at 933.
107. Describing them as dictum: Bonham, supra note 91, at 523; Corwin II, supra note 88, at
367; see GOUGH,supra note 91, at 32 n.4; R. MOTr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 50,56 (1926) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MOTT]; "[N]ot a dictum, but a very material portion of his argument." Thorne, supra
note 91, at 21; "[Tjhe fourth argument is not a dictum, but takes its proper place as one of the five
arguments directed toward the interpretation of the act." DiscouRsE, supra note 91, at 88 n. 187.
108. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and.JudicialReview, 40 HARv. L. REv. 30, 34 (1926) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Plucknett].
109. Thorne, supra note 91, at 21.
110. DiscouRsE, supra note 91, at 89.
111. See generally GOUGH, supra note 91, at 32-33; BAILYN, supra note 91, at 412, 718 n.9; 2
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 118 (L. Worth & H. Zobel eds. 1965); G. ELTON, THE TUDOR
CONSTITUTION 234 (1972); see also Boudin, supra note 93.
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but others have disagreed."I2 The dispute is fascinating; the meaning of
Coke's words has been analyzed according to their medieval usages, 1"
3
and his cited authorities have been minutely dissected. 1 4 In a sense all
this is irrelevant because whatever Coke meant, the colonists took him
to declare the doctrine of judicial review, 1' 5 and "BonhamIs Case began
a new life in America.""' 6 But in another sense the dispute is highly
relevant; it proves that in the process of interpretation we all "listen
with what psychologists used to call the apperception mass . . . with
what is already in one's head."' 17 The colonists wanted to believe what
they thought Coke said and therefore did believe. And to their accept-
ance of Coke as a revealed authority and as a judge they added their
version of what he said about Magna Carta, which became to them a
bulwark symbol of opposition to arbitrary government. They seem to
have ignored the fact that Bonham's Case was eventually both reversed
and overruled on its merits. I" "We live by symbols, and what shall be
symbolized by any image of the sight depends upon the mind of him
who sees it."" 9
Coke himself treated Bonham's Case as a rule of construction rather
than of constitutional doctrine. Within a year after Bonham, he said
that although the common law could disallow a custom for unreasona-
bleness, it could disallow a statute only for repugnancy "as it appears
by Dr. Bonham's Case . . .,, a proposition acceptable even to his
112. M. KNAPPEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 364 n.10 (1942); Bon-
ham, supra note 91, at 528. "Coke was not asserting simply a rule of statutory construction..."
Corwin II, supra note 88, at 372; Smith, Dr. Bonham's Case and the Modern Significance of Lord
Coke's Influence, 41 WASH. L. REV. 297, 314 (1966), "so called dictum."
113. See, e.g., Plucknett, supra note 108, at 40,41, 55 n.71, 59 n.88; Corwin II, supra note 88, at
376; Bonham, supra note 91, at 530-32. THORNE, supra note 91, at 21-22.
114. Plucknett, supra note 108, at 3548; Boudin, supra note 93, at 23742.
115. HOWARD, supra note 26, at 101.
116. Goebel, supra note 91, at 92.
117. Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 536.
118. Coke said he "acquainted" the Chief Justice of the King's Bench with the judgment and
reasons in Bonham's Case and "he well approved." 77 Eng. Rep. at 658. But the College brought
a writ of error in the King's Bench and procured a reversal. I G. CLARK, A HISTORY OF THE
ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON 213, 215 (1964). Although no report of this reversal
has been found, the procedure was usual. As Coke himself wrote, "for if error be in the Common
Pleas, that may be reversed in the King's Bench." Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342
(1607); 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 201, 222, 245. The statement that after Coke's opinion
in Bonham's Case "Parliament simply re-enacted the statute!," H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 322 (4th ed. 1980), is not documented. It may reflect confusion between acts of Parlia-
ment and the "statutes" which the College could itself adopt. See I G. CLARK, A HISTORY OF
THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON 211-12 (1964). In Groenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng.
Rep. 1202, 1211-12 (K.B. 1697), Lord Holt held that the College was a court of record, that its acts
were not traversable, and that Groenvelt, who had been committed for malpractice, could not sue
the College for false imprisonment. On Holt's disparagement of Coke and on the elements of
personal interest each had in the respective cases see Goldberg, Horseshoers, Doctors and Judges
and the Law on Medical Competence, 9 PAC. L.J. 107, 128, 131 (1978).
119. 0. HOLMES, John Marshall in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270 (1920).
120. In reply to a committee including the Lord Treasurer Coke said:
[The King cannot change any part of the common law, nor create any offence by his
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implacable critic Lord Ellesmere.' And in two of his marginal refer-
ences to Bonham in his Institutes he treats it as an example of the rule
that the various parts of a statute are to be harmonized if possible,
"otherwise the Act should be contrary to it selfe, which in all Exposi-
tions is to bee avoided,"' 2 and that a statute impossible of performance
need not be observed.1
2 3
Of equal interest is what Coke did not say. When he referred to
what he called "a Maxime in Law" that one should not be a judge in
his own case,'2 4 he did not say that violation of the maxim was contrary
to the law of the land, ie., Magna Carta. The absence of a reference to
Magna Carta cannot be satisfactorily explained as an inadvertence be-
cause of his holding, about five years after Bonham's Case, in the case
of "the impudent fellow named Bagg."' 2 5  Bagg, a burgess of Plym-
outh, was disenfranchised without notice, opportunity to answer, or a
hearing for conduct towards the mayor so unseemly that, following the
example of Gibbon, "the licentious passages are left in the decent ob-
scurity of a learned language."'2 6 Coke restored him to his franchise
because the corporation did not have authority to remove him for rea-
sonable cause "by charter or prescription," which would have been 'er
legem terrae" and, therefore, permissible under "Magna Charta, cap.
29," and so he could be removed only after conviction 'oerjudicium
proclamation, which was not an offence before, without Parliament. . .also the law of
England is divided into three parts, common law, statute law, and custom; but the King's
proclamation is none of them.
Proclamations, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353, 1354 (1610). He thereafter made the statement quoted in
the text in Rowles v. Mason, 123 Eng. Rep. 892, 895 (C.P. 1610), which Thorne uses. Thorne,
supra note 91, at 17, but Corwin discounts, Corwin II, supra note 88, at 374.
121. He [the new chiefjustice's grandfather unlike the then recently deposed Coke] chal-
lenged not power for the Judges of this Court to. . .judge Statutes and Acts of Parlia-
ment to be void, if they conceived them to be against common right and reason; . . I
speak not of impossibilities or direct repugnances.
The Lord Chancellor's Speech to Sir Henry Montague, when he was Sworn Chief Justice of the
Kings Bench, 72 Eng. Rep. 931, 932 (1616).
122. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 402 (1642) (misnumbered 204 in original).
123. d. at 587-88.
124. "Q/uia aliquis non debet esse Judex in propria causa." I E. COKE, INSTITUTES 141 (1628);
see 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
125. Bagg's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (K.B. 1612); "[I]f a Freeman in City, Burgh or Town
corporate be disfranchised unjustly... this court (King's Bench) may relieve the party, as it
appeareth in James Bagg's case." 4 E. Coke, INSTITUTES 71 (1644).
126. CROGATE: Why, what did he do?
BARON SURREBUTTER: I am almost ashamed to say. He came up to me, and without
the smallest ceremony (to use the language of the pleadings in his case), "Convertens
posteriem partem corporis sui more inhumano et incivili versus meipsum scurriliter con-
temptuose inciviliter et alta voce dixit haec anglicana verba sequentia, videlicit,-COME
AND KISS.
CROGATE I can guess pretty well what you mean, though I don't know much Latin
G. Hayes, Crogate's Case: 4 Diaglogue inye Shades on Special Pleading Reform, in 9 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Appendix 421 (3d ed. 1944). Those who cannot guess may
see 77 Eng. Rep. at 1275 where the conduct is said to be "contra bonos mores. . . but no cause of
disfranchisement, or of indictment." Id. n.*.
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parium suorum" of a crime "whereby he has become infamous."' 127
And, he added, even if there was authority to remove him by charter or
prescription, the instant removal was void and not binding because of
the lack of notice and opportunity to defend.12 8 Note that Bagg's Case
invalidated the acts of a municipal corporation for violation of a stat-
ute, Magna Carta; no case has been found holding a statute invalid for
violating another statute, not even Magna Carta.'29 Thus Coke in Bon-
ham, cannot if he were consistent, be considered to have treated the
statute of the College of Physicians as void because it was not part of
the law of the land; it was simply a part of the law of the land that for
reasons he found sufficient would not be applied to reach what he con-
sidered an absurd result-an old and conventional principle of statu-
tory construction. 130 Lord Coke said nothing in Bonham about law of
the land or due process. Chief Justice Taft, not Lord Coke, elevated
aliquis non debet esse Judex inpropria causa from a canon of propriety
to an element of due process of law.' 31 To anticipate a bit of the story,
the common law maxim forbidding double jeopardy is incorporated in
the Constitution.'32 Following the conventional canon of expressio
unius, one might conclude that those maxims not incorporated were
not constitutional requirements. But we are dealing with a "noninter-
pretive mode," and by Chief Justice Taft's time it was common learn-
ing that due process of law included some maxims not expressed in the
Constitution. 133 And this learning has since been followed. Witness
127. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1279.
128. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1280. "For practical purposes. . . the history of mandamus begins with
Bagg's Case." J. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
257 (1965).
129. See Berger, "Law ofthe Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Law o/the Land] (quoting Plucknett, supra note 108, at 628, 629).
130. E.g., Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940); Quincy (Mass.), Appendix 523-
24 (1865).
131. "But except in cases resting on such ["remote, trifling and insignificant"] reasons, we do
not see how the legislature can have any power to abolish a maxim which is among the fundamen-
tals ofjudicial authority." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927). But see the notes of Horace
Gray, later a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Quincy (Mass.), Appendix 525 n.25
(1865); SMITH, supra note 89, at 361-62. For recent examples of the problem, see Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980); American General Ins. Co. v. F.T.C., 589 F.2d 462 (9th Cir.
1979); Applebaum v. Board of Directors of Barton Memorial Hosp., 104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 163
Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). Bonham's Case lives on.
132. Coke reported "the maxim of common law is, that the life of a man shall not be twice put
in jeopardy for one and the same offence." Vaux's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 992, 993 (K.B. 1591); see
Goebel, supra note 91, at 448.
133. The maxims of Magna Charta and the common law are the interpreters of constitu-
tional grants of power, and those acts which by those maxims the several departments of
government are forbidden to do cannot be considered within any grant or apportionment
of power which the people in general terms have made to those departments.
T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 175 (1868). See id. at 356, 410. See also Exparte Ah
Fook, 49 Cal. 402, 406 (1874). Long before the restraint of the fourteenth amendment, Justice
Chase said a state legislature could not make a man ajudge in his own case. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). And Chief Justice John Marshall intimated the same. See Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810).
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the raising of the common law maxim requiring proof beyond a reason-
able doubt in criminal cases' 34 to constitutional stature over the objec-
tion of Justice Black that this turns "law of the land" into "law of the
judges."'
' 35
Coke's influence on the foundation of the doctrine of judicial review
was, however, based as much on his activities as a politician after he
left the bench and as a commentator on the law as it was on the author-
ity of Bonham's Case. Plucknett's argument that Coke misapplied me-
dieval precedents in Bonham for his own political purposes and
engaged in "an antiquarian revival of obsolescent law with a view to
applying it to current needs,""'36 ie., limitation of the king's power,
may be correct. Indeed Coke has been called the father of "the Whig
interpretation of English history,"' 137 which eventually led to the doc-
trine of Parliamentary supremacy in England. 38 But advocacy of such
legislative omnicompetence cannot account for Coke's acceptability in
the United States.
COKE, MAGNA CARTA, AND LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
Some have questioned whether Coke was an advocate of Parliamen-
tary supremacy, and whether his works were used in the formative pe-
riod of the Union to support such supremacy. A fairly typical
statement is that Coke believed that "[s]tatutes, to be legitimate, must
conform to this fundamental law [Magna Carta], and merely because a
declaration is an Act of Parliament is no guarantee that it is according
to the principles of the English common law and custom.' 39 This idea
seems attractive to us because, if true, and combined with the more
extravagant implications of Bonham's Case, it provides an unblemished
pedigree or clear chain of title for the current institution of judicial
review "because it [Magna Carta] was a document and so gave definite,
134. For references to the reasonable doubt rule as a maxim, see J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 551-53, 557 (1898); 9 J. WIGMORe, EVIDENCE
§2497 at 320-21 (3d ed. 1940).
135. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384 (1970).
136. Plucknett, supra note 108, at 45.
137. ASHLEY, supra note 47, at 4, 53, 60-61.
138. Cf. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 53-54.
139. MOTT, supra note 107, at 67. Although Dean Griswold called Mott a "leading author,"
E. Griswold, Per Legem Terrae, in THE 5TH AMENDMENT TODAY 32 (1955), Mott's book received
rather tepid reviews on publication and posthumous withering denunciation. Law afthe Land,
supra note 129, at 2, 28, 29. In addition to the faults found by Berger, Mott was plainly wrong in
saying that Terelt v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815), overruled Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6
Call) 113 (1804). See Selden v. Overseers of Poor, 38 Va. (I I Leigh) 127 (1840); MOTT, supra note
107, at 196. And Mott's statement that prior to Barron v. Balimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833),
there were "numerous dicta" that the fifth amendment limited the states is not supported by his
citations. See MOTT, supra note 107, at 203, & n.45. Nevertheless, what Berger calls the "moun-
tain of facts" Mott amassed remains useful as a case finder even thought his conclusions are
suspect.
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tangible embodiment to the notion of higher law."' 40 Unfortunately
for purposes of lucid and succinct explanation, it is not true.
"In 1297 the famous Confirmatio Cartarum by Edward I provided
that 'if any judgments be given from henceforth contrary to the points
of the Charter aforesaid. . . they shall be holden for naught'."14 1 And
"[i]n 1369 Parliament sought to deprive future parliaments of the
power to effect any alterations in the terms of Magna Carta."' 142 From
these origins there are attributed to Coke the notion that Magna Carta
was unalterable, 43 and the proposition "that any statute passed by Par-
liament contrary to Magna Carta, the cornerstone of the rights of En-
glishmen should be 'holden for none.'"' Coke did indeed use the
words "holden for none," and this form of statement gives the impres-
sion that Coke considered Magna Carta something like a constitution
that controlled future legislation. 145 Coke is said to have once argued
in Parliament in 1628, "that since 'all statutes against Magna Carta are
deemed void,' the Commons might not alter the charter."' 146 But if
Coke had intended to declare the inviolability of Magna Carta enforce-
able by judicial supremacy, one would think that he would have said so
in his Institutes, particularly the second. 147 But what he actually wrote
was this:
The highest and most binding Laws are the Statutes which are estab-
lished by Parliament; and by authority of that highest Court it is en-
acted (onely to shew their tender care of Magna Charta, and Charta
de Foresta) That if any Statute be made contrary to the great Char-
ter, or the Charter of the Forest, that shall be holden for none: By
which words all former Statutes made against either of those Char-
140. Corwin I, supra note 64, at 176.
141. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 37-38; HOWARD, supra note 26, at 9.
142. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 39.
143. The classical statement seems to be "Even Bacon agrees with Coke that Magna Charta is
unalterable." C. MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT 64 (1910). Berger and Grey
repeat Mcllwain uncritically. R. BERGER, CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT 358, & n.43
(1969); cf. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 9, at 194 n.4; Grey, Origins of the Unwritten
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 852
(1978). Mcllwain's conclusion that Coke and Bacon agreed is now questioned. ASHLEY, supra
note 47, at 10 n.16. On Coke's vacillations, see ASHLEY, supra note 47, at 8-13; 5 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 472-78 (3d ed. 1945).
144. HOWARD, supra note 26, at 18. Both Howard and Grey, see note 143 supra, cite 2 E.
COKE, INSTITUTES Proeme (unpaged) (1642). This makes it hard to see why they did not qualify
their statements. See note 153 infra.
145. HOWARD, supra note 26, at 122; MOTT, supra note 107, at 63 n.58. Corwin II, supra note
88, at 374 n.32, gives other references that might give the same impression but carefully explains
that Coke recognized Parliament's authority as a court.
146. WHITE, supra note 81, at 255.
147. The Institutes were written by 1628, but only the first, commonly known as COKE ON
LITTLETON, was then published. The last three were confiscated by the crown and not published
until 1641 or 1644, WHITE, supra note 81, at 10, although the publisher's date in the facsimile
edition of the second is 1642; 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 454-55 (3d ed.
1945). Coke may have feared publication would "shorten his few remaining years by. . . impris-
onment in the Tower." Id. at 471.
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ters are now repealed; .. 148
His authority, cited in the margin, is 42 Edward III, chapter 1, the stat-
ute of 1369 referred to by Goodhart. t49 That he really meant that for-
mer inconsistent statutes were repealed but that subsequent statutes
contrary to Magna Carta were valid is shown by his examples. As an
example of invalidity he cites not a statute, but a town charter and
ordinance. 150 On a statute he cites the notorious case of Empson and
Dudley, "Justices of peace" who, by "Act of Parliament made," prose-
cuted "infinite numbers of people" without prior indictment or present-
ment "by the verdict of twelve men upon a bare information" as an
example of "horrible oppression, and exactions." He does not say the
statute was invalid but only that it was repealed by an act of 1 Henry
VIII (1509), and that the the necessity for the repeal should "admon-
ish" Parliaments to adhere to trial "per legem terrae" and "bring not in
absolute, and partiall trialls by discretion."15' He repeats the story of
the "unsufferable pressures and oppressions" by Empson and Dudley
with the warning that it is "[a] good caveat to Parliaments to leave all
causes to be measured by the golden and streight metwand of the law,
and not to the incertain and crooked cord of discretion."' '52 But he
does not say that a law is void if Parliament does not follow his admo-
nition. And as an example of an act which was to be deemed repealed
by the statute of 1369, he cites 17 Edward II "capitulum ultimo" (1333),
which, of course, if inconsistent with Magna Carta would have been
within the literal meaning of the later act as a repealer. 153 And he said
expressly: "[s]ubsequent parliaments cannot be restrained by the for-
mer."'154 Holdsworth believed Coke's post-Bonham views were recan-
tations evidencing his political bias and that he came to admit the
supremacy of Parliament "freely and fully," that he believed not in
"supremacy of an unchangeable law, but [in] the supremacy of a law
Parliament can change."' 55 And, as a practical matter, even chapter 29
(or 39) has been departed from in temporary and abnormal times when
148. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES, Proeme (4th of the unpaged pages) (1642). See also 4 id. 36
(1644).
149. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 39.
150. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 54 (1642); see Law ofthe Land, supra note 129, at 4-5.
151. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 51 (1642).
152. 4 id. 41 (1644).
153. 3 Id. 111 (1644). In 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES §108 at 81 (1628) he did say: "[a]nd by the
statute of 42 E. 3, ca. 3. if any statute be made against either of these Charters it shall be voide."
Either he had second thoughts or elided the full exposition as did Grey and Howard some three
hundred years later. See note 144 supra.
154. 4 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 43 (1644) under the heading "Acts against the power of the Par-
liament subsequent bind not." Id. at 42. This is still hombook law. See County of Sacramento v.
Lackner, 97 Cal. App. 3d 576, 589-90, 159 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8-9 (1979).
155. See generally 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 187 (3d ed. 1945); 5 id.
at 475-76. See generally PALLISTER, supra note 47, at 103; GOODHART, supra note 47, at 40.
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required by national security. "[A] war could not be carried out ac-
cording to the principles of Magna Charta."' 56
Although they seem clear enough, two famous passages from Coke
have been much debated. The one is the statement he attributed to
Herle, C.J., "the award of Parliament was the highest Law that could
bee."' 57 The other is: "Of the power and jurisdiction of the Parliament
for making of laws in proceeding by Bill, it is so transcendent and abso-
lute, as it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within any
bounds."' s Corwin explains these passages as instances of Coke's fail-
ure to distinguish between Parliament's dual capacities as a court and
as a legislature, and says these passages were not exemplifications of
legislative sovereignty.' 59 Boudin, considering the second, relates it to
Coke's statement in Parliament that "Magna Charta is such a fellow
that he knows no sovereign," and says that "sovereign" meant only the
king, i e., that the charter was a restriction only on executive rather
than legislative power. 160 The implications of these arguments are that
whatever Coke said, he considered Parliament bound by some sort of
higher or fundamental or natural law. Pallister argues that Coke did
not express himself on that point. Coke "never suggested-indeed
never imagined-that it [Magna Carta] might be applied or need to be
applied against parliament."' 6' The United States Supreme Court
took this tack almost a century ago when it said in Hurtado v. Califor-
nia:
[W]e shall be ready to acknowledge that it is better not to go too far
back into antiquity for the best securities for our 'ancient liber-
ties' . ..
The concessions of Magna Charta were wrung from the King as
guaranties against the oppressions and usurpations of his preroga-
tive. It did not enter into the minds of the barons to provide security
against their own body or in favor of the Commons by limiting the
power of Parliament .... The actual and practical security for Eng-
lish liberty against legislative tyranny was the power of a free public
opinion represented by the Commons.'
62
This statement was written while Mr. Justice Gray was a member of
156. PALLISTER, supra note 47, at 103 (quoting Lord Scrutton in Ronnfeldt v. Phillps, 35
T.L.R. 46, 47 (C.A. 1918)).
157. 2 E. COKE, INsTiTuTFs 498 (1642).
158. 4 id. 36 (1644).
159. Corwin II, supra note 88, at 374-79. See generally GOUGH, supra note 91, at 42-43.
160. See Boudin, supra note 93, at 235. See also PALLISTER, supra note 47, at 48; HOWARD,
supra note 26, at 234 (views of James Madison). GOODHART, supra note 47, at 68. "Magna Carta
is such a fellow as he will have no saving," WHrrE, supra note 81, at 267.
161. PALLISTER, supra note 47, at 48.
162. 110 U.S. 516, 530, 531, 532 (1884). See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102
(1877). For a similar sloughing off of inconvenient history see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y.
378, 392 (1856).
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the court, and it is Gray's appendix to Quincy's report of Paxton's
Case, The Writs of Assistance Case, which supplied much of the raw
material for the later writings on Bonham.'63 Although it has been sug-
gested that Gray's history may have been unduly emphasized, its accu-
racy has not been attacked, and his concurrence is some indication of
Hurtado 's accuracy.
The fact is that Bonham, which says nothing about natural law but is
based on the law of reason, had read into it part of what Coke had said
earlier in Calvin's Case: "[t]he law of nature is part of the law of En-
gland: ... the law of nature was before any judicial or municipal law:
... the law of nature is immutable."'" This expansion of Bonham
was then combined with a reading of Coke on Magna Carta to attribute
to him the idea that Magna Carta had no sovereign of any sort, neither
king nor parliament, that it was expression of fundamental law limiting
both indifferently. I" In Calvin Coke did say "the Parliament could not
take away the protection which the law of nature giveth."' t6 6 The stat-
ute he said was invalid was that of 25 Edward III, chapter 22 (1351),
which was presumably repealed by 42 Edward III, chapter 1 (1369).
And if one applies Coke's heretofore ignored qualification in his
Proeme to his Second Institute concerning the repeal of "former Stat-
utes," Coke becomes consistent. Thus Calvin should not be combined
with an expansive reading of Bonham and Coke on Magna Carta to
attribute to Coke the invention of the idea that Magna Carta had no
sovereign of any sort.167 Through reverence of Coke, immutability be-
came another myth of Magna Carta, 6s but "in world history myths are
163. See Goebel, supra note 91, at 93 n.191.
164. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 391-92 (C.P. 1608). Here Coke cited "Doctor and Stu-
dent, cap. 2. and 4." Doctor and Student does say: "The lawe of nature specyally consydered:
whiche is also called the lawe of [reason]" [brackets in original], ST. GERMAN'S DOCTOR AND
STUDENT, 91 SELDEN SOCIETY 13 (T. Plucknett and J. Barton eds. 1974), and continues "it may
not be put awaye/ ne it is neuer chaungeable by no dyuerstie of place ne tyme. . . for natural
rights are immutable ... And therefore agaynst this lawe prescripcyon statute nor custome may
not preuayle," id. at 15. As Thorne wrote, if in Bonham Coke meant to declare a statute void as
beyond parliamentary authority, it is difficult to explain why he did not again cite Doctor and
Student. DIscouRsE, supra note 91, at 86. Berger suggests that Coke "might well have felt no
need to repeat citations for a point so generally accepted and so recently reiterated," and that "a
seventeenth century lawyer might reasonably assume that Coke's 'against reason' [in Bonham] was
the familiar version of 'against the law of nature' [in Calvin]." Bonham, supra note 91, at 529.
Without attempting to assess the correctness of either point of view, Berger's article is an explana-
tion of how Bonham was extended via Calvin in the United States. St. German is said to have
eventually concluded that parliamentary authority was absolute. Abrams, Kingship, Equity and
Natural Law in Christopher St. German, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 467, 478-
79 (M. Forkosch ed. 1966).
165. GOUGH, supra note 91, at 31 n.l.
166. 77 Eng. Rep. at 393. "On the fact of it this looks like a theory that the law of nature was a
fundamental law, and constituted a limit to parliament's legislative capacity." GoUGH, supra note
91, at 44-45.
167. ASHLEY, supra note 47, at 30-31.
168. The original myth was that Magna Carta was a popular constitutional document rather
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often more potent and longer-lived than are the facts."' 6 9
Whether the myth of.immutability was invented by Coke or by his
followers or enemies is not important here. My purpose is not the
moral one of either legitimizing or bastardizing the American institu-
tion of judicial review and the standards whereby it is exercised. My
purpose is the physiological one of trying to describe the birth process
and showing how anomalous it is if tested by ordinary rules of interpre-
tation. "It tickles the fancy that Bonham's Case, adapted and stretched
as might be, rose up in America to avenge itself upon the parlimentary
absolutism that had thrust it into limbo in England," and it also shows
how a governing mind can be "stupified on its own hokum."' 17 With
than one of feudal reaction. See Jenks, The Myth of the Magna Carta, 4 INDEPENDENT REV. 260
(1904). For other references to a myth of Magna Carta, see PALLISTER, supra note 47, at preface,
1, 3, 4; GOODHART, supra note 47, at 16, 22-24 (1966); C. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 34 (2d ed. 1932) [hereinafter cited as HAINES].
169. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 4.
170. SMITH, supra note 89, at 491. Bonham survived in principle long after its reversal on the
merits, see notes 88-92 supra, and its passage to oblivion was not wholly serene. It and Cal'in
were applied but not cited in Day v. Savadge, 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 237 (C.P. 1614):
[E]ven an Act of Parliament, made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his
own case, is void in its self, for jura naturae sunt immutabilia, and they are leges legum.
It "bore strange fruit," Plucknett, spra note 108, at 53; in Godden Y. Hales, 89 Eng. Rep. 1050
(K.B. 1686), when applied by a rigged court to hold an act of parliament could not alter the king's
prerogative. (The rigging is amusingly described in 2 J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICES 85-87 (5th ed. 1868).) Godden was followed by the Revolution of 1688, which should
have obliterated Bonham, Plucknett, supra note 108, at 53-54, but it survived to be applied by
Lord Holt, not an unqualified admirer of Coke, see Groenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng. Rep. 1202,
1212 (K.B. 1697); in City of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B. 1701), the court said:
[Wihat my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's Case in his 8 Co. is far from any ex-
travagency ... it is impossible that one should be Judge and party. . . and an Act of
Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd ...
Holt's opinion wavers so that within one paragraph it has been called both Bonham's "last hur-
rah" and "final flicker." SMITH, supra note 89, at 489; Plucknett, supra note 108, at 54, 55.
Bonham may have flickered out, but its embers continue to glow in law books, see, e.g., M.
BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 635 12, 13 (6th ed. 1793); 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 91 (1765) (cited as "8 Rep. 118"). By an old custom Coke's reports are referred to
as "The Reports." Id. at 72. Plucknett, supra note 108, at 30.
Blackstone originally disparaged Bonham by saying that no power could control Parliament,
but by his ninth edition he revived it a bit by saying that there was no power "in the ordinary
forms of Constitution" that could control Parliament. Gray, Quincy, Appendix 1 526 n.26 (Mass.
1865). Blackstone is so obsure that Jeremy Bentham said, "He speaks the word and all is dark-
ness." C. EVERETT, INTRODUCTION TO J. BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 19
(1945). And Goebel suggested that the "shifty passages of the tenth rule," the one Blackstone
changed, had been drafted by a committee. GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 94. Gray conjectured
"[plerhaps the American Revolution forced itself... upon the notice of the learned commenta-
tor." Gray, Quincy, Appendix I 526 n.26 (Mass. 1865). Cf. Plucknett, supra note 108, at 60.
Gray's conjecture is compatible with a form in which Blackstone became popular in America. I
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 91 n.20 (St. G. Tucker ed. 1803) ("[A]ll acts of the legislature
which violate... [the] Constitution... are not binding upon any other branch of the
federal or State government .. ") Tucker's is said to have been the most important of the early
American treatises. J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 256-57 (1950).
Bonham continued to be "quoted by silly people", 2 J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHAN-
CELLORS 383 (5th ed. 1868). Day v. Savadge was formally interred by Lee v. Bude & Torrington
Junction Ry. Co., L.R. 6 C.P. 576, 582 (1871). And in the case of the "railway enthusiast who
bought for ten shillings the reversionary interest in twenty-two yards of a disused railway line,"
Wallington, Sovereignty Regained, 37 MOD. L. REV. 686 (1974), Bonham was recently disposed of
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its extrapolations and extensions it was one of the sources, but not the
only source of the problem that to this day remains intractable:
the interplay between the tradition of looking to fundamental docu-
ments for guarantees of men's liberties and the visions of a "higher
law" from which those liberties spring. . . . [W]hether in conffict or
in unison, the two traditions of natural law and constitutional law
[became] part and parcel of life and law in America.'
71
COLONIAL SOURCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The other sources of the present problem are more elusive than trac-
ing a simple line of descent from Bonham or Calvin as precedents.
They include religion, political philosophy, and the fact that colonial
activities were subject to judicial review in England. 172 A primary fac-
tor is that when the Puritans settled the Massachusetts Bay Colony in
the 1620's, they assumed "that there were definite limits which the leg-
islators were not free to transgress-this, in a word, was constitutional-
ism."' 73  Put somewhat differently, the concept of Parlimentary
sovereignty, which resulted from the Revolution of 1688 in England
and extinguished Bonham as a practical authority there, fell into
an uncongenial environment here, never flourished, and eventually
died.1
74
The Puritan preoccupation with the laws of God and their relation to
the proper limits of political power "was never better stated than by
John Cotton," a Puritan divine, writing of the necessity to limit the
"liberty and authority: of magistrates and officers of the church and
commonwealth:"
[Flor what ever transcendant power is given, it will certainly over-
run those that give it, and those that receive it: There is a straine in a
mans heart that will sometime or other runne out to excesse, unless
the Lord restrain it, but it is not good to venture it: It is necessary
therefore, that all power that is on earth be limited.'
75
One source of limitation was the word of God. Thus the Massachusetts
laws of 1648 provided in paraphrase of Magna Carta:
in principle if not by name. See British Rys. Board v. Pickin, [1974] A.C. 765, 782, 798. "[A]
happy ending-at least for the orthodox constitutional lawyer." Wallington, supra, at 686.
171. Cf. HOWARD, supra note 26, at 52.
172. HAINES, supra note 168, at 227 n.48. "The history of judicial review in the colonies sug-
gests many roots. 2 LEOAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 121 n.44 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds.
1965).
173. 1 D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 20 (Caravelle ed. 1958)
[hereinafter cited as BOORSTIN].
174. Morgan, Colonial Ideals of Parliamentary Power, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1789 151 (J. Greene ed. 1968); SMITH, supra note 89, at 490-92.
175. BOORSTIN, supra note 173, at 30. See also BOORSTIN, supra note 173, at 28 (religious
offenses made capital crimes).
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That no mans life shall be taken away; no mans honour or good
name shall be stayned ... unles it be by the vertue or equity of
some expresse law of the Country warranting the same established by
a General Court & sufficiently published; or in case of the defect of a
law in any particular case by the word of God. And in capital cases,
or in cases concerning dismembring [sic] or banishment according to
that word to be judged by the General Court.
17 6
The laws of the Plymouth Colony had a similar provision:
[N]o person in this Government shall be damaged in respect of Life,
Limb, Liberty, Good name or Estate, under colour of Law, or coun-
tenance of Authority, but by virtue of equity of some expres law of
the General Court of this Colony, the known Law of God, or the
good and equitable laws of our Nation suitable for us, being brought
to Answer by due process thereof.
17 7
Invocation of the limiting laws of God was not necessarily innova-
tive. English lawyers and judges had given the Bible "special cogency"
as the source of law, but the Puritans were more literal in their reading
of the Bible and more influenced by it than their fellow Englishmen.1
78
Thus, in 1657, came the case Corwin described as the earliest example
he had seen of "the proverb which may be regarded as the 'folk-origin,'
so to speak, of American constitutional law, that 'the property of A
cannot be given to B without A's consent.'" A magistrate held the
town of Ipswich, Massachusetts, could not levy a tax to buy a dwelling
to give in fee to its minister, and cited among his authorities the "fun-
damental law which God and nature has given to the people."'
' 79
Corwin said the case was "specific evidence of Coke's influence" during
the early colonial period.8 0 But since neither he nor the other com-
mentators indicate that the magistrate, who is said to have been "a
176. T. BARNES, THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTIES CONCERNING THE IN-
HABITANTS OF MASSACHUSETTS 1 (1975). This is a reprint of the "Code of 1648," Id. introduction
at 7. The quoted portion, in turn, is a repetition of the preamble to the "Body of Liberties" of
1641. Id. introduction 7-8; MOTT, supra note 107, at 9-10.
177. J. CUSHING, THE LAWS OF THE PILGRIMS 2 (1977). This is a facscimile of "The Book of
the General Laws of the Inhabitants of The Jurisdiction of New-Plimouth," 1672 & 1675. The
quotation is from the printing of 1672. The reference to God was omitted in the revision of 1671
printed in 1685, by which time Plymouth was merged with Massachusetts Bay and other colonies
into the Dominion of New England. Id. at xvii-xviii. The 1685 edition provides, "And none need
suffer as aforesaid, without being brought to answer by due course and process of Law."
178. G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 144, 145 (1960). The
statement that the colonial administrators of the law "were compelled to fall back on the Bible or
on popular conceptions of natural law" is not borne out by the more recent historians. The resort
seems to have been a matter of choice rather than necessity. But cf. HAINES, supra note 168, at 38.
179. Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REV. 102, 105 (1910); Corwin
II, supra note 88, at 395; MOTT, supra note 107, at 115-17. The case is Giddings v. Brown, 2
Hutchinson Papers 1 (1865) reprinted in part in D. McGovNEY, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
8 (1930) and M. HOWE, READINGS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 231 (1949). The quotation is
from McGOVNEY at 9 and HOWE at 232. McGoVNEY, at 8 n.8, and HOWE at 240 n.7, but not
Corwin, note that the Ipswich magistrate was overruled by the General Court at Boston.
180. Corwin II, supra note 88, at 394-95.
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careful student and great admirer of the English common law,"' 8' cited
Coke, another historian's view that the case exemplifies a conception of
the New England colonists that the common law was "not at all bind-
ingper se, but in as far as expressive of the law of God to be used for
purposes of illustration and guidance"' 82 seems just as likely. And
what may be equally likely is that the action of the magistrate was a
reflection of colonial constitutionalism-the assumption that there were
definite limits which the legislature was not free to transgress. 8 3 The
magistrate anticipated Locke by some forty years.
18 4
The linkage of the "immutable" natural law to common law and the
law of God in the minds of the colonists must be emphasized. The ser-
mon was a principle means of affirming the values of the community,
and "[t]he New England meeting-house, like the synagogue on which it
was consciously modeled, was primarily a place of instruction ...
[The sermon was the central event in the meeting-house."'8 5 The Puri-
tan sermon is said to have been "more like a lawyer's brief than a work
of art." 86 And John Milton, arguing that one parliament could not
bind its successors, complained of hearing "mooting and law lectures
from the pulpit."'1 87 Mrs. Bowen gave a colorful account of the sort of
sermons to which young John Adams was exposed.
How were Englishmen governed, Mr. Briant [the preacher] de-
manded, leaning forward, his thin young hands grasping the pulpit
rail. By His Majesty George the Second-and long might he reign!
By the will of Parliament, yes. But above and beyond this was an-
other, greater will, another law. God's law-natural law, the law of
the people, granted them by heaven. Alone among governments of
the world, the British constitution was founded not on the heriditary
power of kings, but on a compact made originally between God and
Moses or between God and man. This compact was the glorious in-
heritance of Englishmen. This was the people's law! And it was
higher than parliaments, higher than kings. If Parliament and King
181. Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367, 376 (1907). Boorstin lists Reinsch among the few
important and competent works on the history of American lawyers and private law. BOORSTIN,
supra note 173, at 399.
182. Reinsch, The English Common Law in the EarlyAmerican Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 377 (1907).
183. BOORSTIN, supra note 173, at 20.
184. In his so-called Second Treatise of Government, published in 1698, Locke wrote: "138.
Thirdly, The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without his own
consent." J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES oF GOVERNMENT 406 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963).
185. BOORSTIN, supra note 173, at 12; see G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MAS-
SACHUSETrS 88-93, 118-19 (1960). Corwin II, supra note 88, at 395-96; BAILYN, supra note 89, at
27. See generally BOORSTIN, supra note 173, at 10-19.
186. BOORSTIN, supra note 173, at 11.
187. GOUGH, supra note 91, at 138.
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did not obey, men had a right to rebel.188
Added to the ideas of a limited government derived from the laws of
God were those the colonists took from John Locke. From Corwin,
one might get the idea that Locke was almost the exclusive source of
colonial thinking about natural rights or liberties and the social com-
pact, 18 9 but it is now clear that his influence was not unique. 190
Locke's thesis was that there need be no sovereign government, un-
controlled by law, in a state. All men are born with certain natural
rights which they hold as human beings and not as subjects of the
state. It is to protect these rights that the state is created by the con-
sent of the men who compose it. The power of the state need not and
ought not to be unlimited; it is held in trust for the people and should
be used only for their benefit.' 9 '
Indeed, in the decade or so preceding the American Revolution, colo-
nial thinking had progressed beyond Locke's conception of the people
as a check on government and the traditional view that law was a com-
mand prescribed by a superior (the sovereign) to an inferior (the sub-
ject), to the view that the binding power of law flowed only from the
continuous assent of the subjects of law,192 a view wrapped up in the
slogan, "[N]o taxation without representation."'' 93 This rallying cry of
revolution may have been doubtfully derived from Magna Carta's pro-
visions on scutage and aids,'94 but there is no doubt that to Americans
it connoted a limit on Parliament's authority over them.
Another contributor to the America idea of judicial review of legisla-
tion was the practice during the colonial period of reviewing cases
before the Privy Council sitting as a judicial body, as distinguished
from the practice of presenting colonial statutes to that body for its
administrative disallowance of such statutes for lack of conformity to
the laws of England. 195 The policy influenced American legislation,
although the procedure of such appeals did not since it was so esoteric
and remote. 96 The leading case was Winthrop v. Lechmere in 1727-28
188. C. BOWEN, JOHN ADAMS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 31-32 (1950).
189. Corwin II, supra note 88, at 389-94.
190. BAILYN, supra note 89, at 24-36.
191. GOODHART, supra note 47, at 53-54.
192. BAILYN, supra note 89, at 98.
193. PALLISTER, supra note 47, at 56-57; GOODHART, supra note 47, at 56.
194. The reference is to chapters 12 and 14 of the 1215 version of Magna Carta. These sections
were omitted from the version of Henry III (1225), which is the definitive form. MCKECHNIE,
supra note 47, at 497 n.2. "[E]nthusiasts found in it [c.12] the modem doctrine that the Crown can
impose no burden without the consent of Parliament." McKECHNIE, supra note 47, at 232. On the
omissions, see McKECHNIE, supra note 47, at 233 255.
195. The most readable account found is McGovney, The British Origin of the Review of Legis-
lation, 93 U. PA. L. REv. I (1944). More extensive accounts are in HAINES, supra note 166, at 44-
66 and J. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 523-664
(1950).
196. Goebel, supra note 91, at 42.
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invalidating a Connecticut statute because it established rules of intes-
tate succession at Variance with the common law of primogeniture. The
case, as such, was never printed, but the "determination was given cur-
rency beyond even the confines of the [legal] profession for it was no-
ticed in a mid-eighteenth century American history book and so
acquired the quality of a notable event, which indeed it was."'197 Its
persistence as a basis for acceptance of the judicial review of statutes is
also illustrated by a discussion between William Samuel Johnson, the
Connecticut agent in England, and Lord Hillsborough in 1768. John-
son clearly understood the concept that a court could declare a statute
unconstitutional. When he was a Connecticut delegate to the Consti-
tutional Convention in 1787, "it is very significant that it was he who
moved in the Convention to insert the words 'this Constitution' before
the word[s] 'the laws' in what is now Article III, Section 2, of the Con-
stitution .. ."198 The effect of Johnson's change "was to place beyond
question the role of the Supreme Court as arbiter of the Constitu-
tion."' 99 Thus the influence of Winthrop v. Lechmere should not be
minimized 200 even though it may not be "the one clear-cut precedent
for the American doctrine of judicial review.
' '20t
THE REVIVAL OF BONHAM BY AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES
Despite the attention lavished on Bonham, even relatively recently,
the effort to derive from it and Coke "Justice Marshall's concept of the
power of judicial review. .. ,0 and its laudation as the "single most
important source of the concept of judicial review, ' 2 3 it is remarkable
how little attention was paid to Bonham in colonial times. Corwin at-
tributes Giddings v. Brown to Coke's influence,204 but the magistrate
197. Goebel, supra note 91, at 78.
198. McGovney, The British Origin of the Review ofLegislation, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 35 (1944).
199. Goebel, supra note 91, at 241.
200. Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REV. 102, 103 (1905), con-
tended that the advocates of judicial review knew nothing about Winthrop v. Lechmere.
McGovney shows he was wrong. "Obviously the political thinking of a people which had abided
for eighty and more years under a scheme of government that maintained a standard to which
law-making must conform was to be thereby affected." 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 283 (Goebel ed. 1964).
James B. Thayer, writing in the late nineteenth century, [The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 130-31 (1893)] thought
this colonial experience [living under written charters enforced by various means includ-
ing appeals to the Privy Council] central to the later adoption of the constitutional doc-
trine of judicial review.
Howard, supra note 26, at 279.
201. Goebel, supra note 91, at 79.
202. Smith, Marbury v. Madison, Lord Coke and Dr. Bonham: Relics ofthe Past Guidelines/or
the Present-Judicial Review in Transition?, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 255, 267 (1979).
203. Smith, Dr. Bonham's Case and the Modern Signffcance of Lord Coke's Influence, 41
WASH. L. REV. 297, 313 (1966).
204. Corwin II, supra note 88, at 394-95.
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cited Dalton's Country Justice and Finch's Law,2" 5 the available edi-
tions of which contain no reference to Bonham. McGovney says that
after Giddings, the next recorded appearance of Coke's dictum in colo-
nial courts was in James Otis's argument in the Writs of Assistance
Case,206 which will be discussed hereafter. This inattention is all the
more remarkable considering the esteem in which the colonials held
Coke.2"7 A partial set of Coke's Reports came over on the
Mawflower. ° In 1647, the General Court of Massachusetts Bay or-
dered, among other of his books, two sets of his reports and his work on
Magna Carta, Le., the Second Institute, "to the end we may have the
better light for making and proceeding about laws."209 In the colonies
"the cornerstone of a legal education, however acquired, was Sir Ed-
ward Coke's works."2 10 Thomas Jefferson, for example, mastered
Coke, admired him, said of him, "a sounder Whig never wrote, nor
profounder learning in the orthodox doctrines of British liberties, 211
and preferred him to "the honeyed Mansfieldism of Blackstone." In-
deed he described "Blackstone lawyers" as "ephemeral insects of the
law." '212 What the colonists could have derived from Coke and a literal
reading of Bonham's Case and Calvin's Case was that the courts could
declare that an act violative of the common law was void, and that an
act contrary to Magna Carta was void, disregarding Coke's qualifica-
tions with regard to the "holden for none" clause applying only to "for-
mer Statutes." Thus the cases and the Institutes may have contributed
to the concept of a "superstatute, a constitution placing fundamental
liberties beyond the reach of Parliament as well as the King and his
ministers."2 13 But the quantity of the contribution is questionable.
The documented revival of Bonham's Case and Day v. Savadge did
not occur until their sesquicentennial when James Otis relied on them
in his argument in Province v. Paxton, more commonly known as Pax-
ton's Case or the Writs ofAssistance Case in 1761.21 4 James Otis (1725-
205. READINGS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 234 n.2, 236 n.3, 237 n.4, 5 (Howe ed. 1949).
206. McGovney, The British Origin ofJudicial Review of Legislation, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 4-5
(1944). Other cases are cited in MoTT, supra note 107, at 91 n.19 but McGovney and Corwin
disregarded them, perhaps because they are inconsequential. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW. 8-10 (1977).
207. E.g, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1980).
208. S. THORNE, SIR EDWARD COKE 1552-1952 1 (1957).
209. BOORSTIN, supra note 173, at 28; G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSA-
CHUSETTS 135 (1960), suggests they were for use in drafting the "Code of 1648." See note 176
supra.
210. HOWARD, supra note 26, at 130.
211. BOORSTIN, supra note 173, at 203.
212. Corwin II, supra note 88, at 405 n.127.
213. HOWARD, supra note 26, at 121-22, 18-19.
214. For a comprehensive and delightful account, see SMITH, supra note 89. For a sparkling
review, see Mann, Book Review, 11 CONN. L. REv. 353 (1979).
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83) was a Boston lawyer, classical scholar and, according to John Ad-
ams, "a great master of the laws of nature and of nations," 21 who, to
vindicate a family political disappointment "most enthusiastically and
frenzically" turned on the administration in its efforts to enforce the
Navigation Acts.2 16 John Adams, then a fledgling lawyer, attended the
arguments and took copious notes, which were edited by Horace Gray,
later to a be a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, but were not
published until nearly a hundred years later in 1865. Thus we have the
curious spectacle of a lawyer relying on cases almost a century and a
half old and that reliance not being made commonly available to the
bar until another century had passed. Otis cited Bonham, and Magna
Carta, chapter 29, Day v. Savadge, and City of London v. Wood.217
Otis, while he recognized the jurisdiction of Parliament over the Col-
onies, denied that it was the final arbiter of the justice and constitution-
ality of its own acts; and relying upon the words of the greatest English
lawyers, and putting out of sight the circumstances under which they
were uttered, contended that the validity of statutes must be judged by
the Courts of Justice. Thus, Otis foreshadowed the principle of Ameri-
can constitutional law, that it is the duty of the judiciary to declare
unconstitutional statutes void.21 ' Otis's words, as noted by John Ad-
ams, were:
As to Acts of Parliament, an Act against the Constitution is void: an
Act against natural Equity is void: and if an Act of Parliament
should be made, in the very Words of this Petition [for a writ of
assistance], it would be void. The Executive Courts must pass such
Acts into disuse-8 Rep. 118 [Bonham's Case] from Viner.-Reason
of ye Coin Law to control an Act of Parliament.219
Otis's attack on the writs of assistance did not receive much public-
ity,220 but it was repeated and amplified in his pamphlet, The Rights of
the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, published in 1764. There he
quoted from Locke, denying that Parliament was omnipotent: "The
Parliament cannot make 2 and 2, 5: omnipotency cannot do it," a para-
phrase of Grotius' proposition that the law of nature is the Law of God
and a Law to. God,22' and consolidated his sentiments.
215. BAILYN, supra note 89, at 410-11.
216. Quincy iv (Mass. 1865).
217. See Quincy 474, 483-85, 520-36 (Mass. 1865).
218. Quincy 520-21 (Appendix I, Gray's notes) (Mass. 1865).
219. Quincy, Appendix 1474 (Mass. 1865). "Executive Courts" means courts ofjustice, which
"execute" the laws as distinguished from "legislative courts" such as the General Court, which
make them. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 128 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel ed. 1965).
220. Lovejoy, 'Rights Imply Equality:" The Case 4gainst 4dmiralty Jurisdiction in America,
1764-1776, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 203 (J. Greene ed. 1968).
221. BAILYN, supra note 89, at 434, 454; Corwin II, supra note 88, at 381 (quoting Grotius); A.
D'ENTREvEs, NATURAL LAW 56 (2d ed. 1970).
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'Tis hoped it will not be considered as a new doctrine that even the
authority of the Parliament of Great Britain is circumscribed by cer-
tain bounds which if exceeded their acts become those of mere power
without right, and consequently void. The judges of England have
declared in favor of these sentiments when they expressly declare
that acts of Parliament against natural equity are void. That acts
against the fundamentalprinciples of the British constitution are void.
This doctrine is agreeable to the law of nature and nations, and to the
divine dictates of natural and revealed religion.222
Bailyn tells us,
Of all the pronouncements issued by the colonists in the agitated year
between the passage of the Sugar Act and that of the Stamp Act
(April 1764-March 1765) none was more widely known or com-
mented upon than James Otis's The Rights of the British Colonies As-
serted and Proved.
223
It was cited with approbation by Lord Chatham, a former Chief Justice
of England, in his argument in the House of Lords against the Stamp
Act. Although Chatham's repudiation of parliamentary sovereignty
has been characterized as a statement of moral principle rather than of
legal right,224 it shows the currency, if not the acceptance, of Otis's the-
ses.
Colonial adherence to Magna Carta as a generic term for documents
of constitutional significance and a symbol and reminder of the princi-
ples binding on government 225 was demonstrated shortly after Otis's
226pamphlet. In Sewall v. Hancock, a prosecution against John Han-
cock for smuggling, John Adams argued for the defense that allowing
the prosecution to proceed before a single judge in admiralty violated
the right to jury trial provided by Magna Carta. This form of prosecu-
tion had been provided by statute of Parliament because "it was a tru-
ism that no jury could be found to convict for violation of the Acts of
Trade." 227 Adams did not argue that the statute was void because it
violated Magna Carta, although others are said to have done so. But
he did refer to Coke's Second Institute at length as an example of the
dangers of abridging the right to jury trial "which if properly attended
might be sufficient even to make a Parliament tremble. ' 228 Adams' ar-
222. BAILYN, supra note 89, at 476-77. Otis cited Bonham and the subsequent cases.
223. BAILYN, .supra note 89, at 409.
224. GOUGH, supra note 91, at 193-94. Chatham was called a "political heretic." PALLISTER,
supra note 47, at 55.
225. Corwin II, supra note 88, at 394.
226. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 173 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel ed. 1965).
227. Id. at 188.
228. Id. at 204. PALLISTER, supra note 47, at 47 offers this explanation of Coke's view:
Fundamental law is thus not so much law that is unchangeable but rather law that it is
dangerous to change; as Coke put it: 'so dangerous a thing it is to shake or alter any of
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gument was digested and sent to the Massachusetts agent in London,
Benjamin Franklin.229 It had been anticipated by the Massachusetts
Assembly when it declared the Stamp Act invalid, "against Magna
Charta and the natural rights of Englishmen, and therefore, according
to the Lord Coke, null and void. '2 30 It remains as an example of the
times showing how legal argument at the courtroom level could be
manipulated into political argument over the nature of government.23'
JUDICIAL REVIEW PRIOR TO MARBURY V. MADISON
A natural inference from the religious, philosophical, and adminis-
trative experience during colonial times is that between the Revolution
and the Constitution, a coherent and accessible body of precedent
would have developed on the standards whereby judicial review of leg-
islation was to be applied. But for at least two reasons what seems
natural did not occur. The first reason is simply mechanical-the ab-
sence of published reports. The second is that the cases on judicial
review that did achieve some relatively broad publicity were directed
more to the legitimacy of the institution than to the standards of re-
view.
The inaccessibility of early American materials troubled even Chan-
cellor Kent, who wrote at the end of the eighteenth century:
When I came to the bench [1798] there were no reports or State
precedents. The opinions from the bench were delivered ore tenus.
We had no law of our own, & nobody knew what it was. I first intro-
duced a thorough examination of cases & written opinions.232
Kent has been corroborated by more recent historians who say vari-
ously of the period, that the law "rested upon oral tradition-it was
a memory jurisprudence," '233 and without reports "there was noth-
ing which could rationally be called a legal system.'. . . We sloughed
off our two hundred years of colonial tutelage as if they had never
been."'2 34 Even those who have attempted to use the whisps and frag-
the rules of fundamental points of the common law, which in truth are the maine pillars
and supports of the fabric of the commonwealth.'
The quotation is from 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 74 (1642), on the impropriety of coroners and
sheriffs accepting rewards from private persons for the performance of their offices. This is an-
other example of lifting Cokean sentiments out of their context and, conversely, of Coke's propen-
sity to erupt with a portentious pontification from a limited subject.
229. Lovejoy, 'Rights Imply Equality:" The Case Against Admiraliy Jurisdiction in America,
1764-1776, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 104 n.61 (J. Greene ed.
1968).
230. C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 315-16 (1957).
231. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 193 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel ed. 1965).
232. Kent, 4n 4merican Law Student of a Hundred YearsAgo, in I SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 842-43 (1907).
233. Goebel, supra note 91, at 112.
234. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 9, 10 (1977).
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ments antedating the Constitution as real or supposed precedents ac-
knowledge the danger of emphasizing them, because "frequently the
opinions which appear so important today are unknown until brought
to light by an enthusiastic student, 2 35 and that they can be discovered
only by "ransacking" the records of the period.
2 36
The handful of cases on judicial review as an institution have been
collected and evaluated by various scholars.237 As a whole they are not
instructive on the standards of review because they involved specifics of
various state constitutions such as the right to trial by jury and, presag-
ing Marbury v. Madison, interference with the structure or jurisdiction
of the courts. They are interesting in a broader sense in that the cir-
cumstances surrounding them can be used to document popular hostil-
ity to the institution and initial acceptance of the idea of legislative
supremacy.238 Two of the better known of these cases illustrate the
point. Rutgers v. Waddington2 39 involved the incompatibility of a New
York statute, The Trespass Act, a pro-patriot relief measure, to the
treaty of peace with England. Although Alexander Hamilton, for the
royalist defendants, invoked the law of nations and Bonham's Case,24
he achieved only a partial success. The court instead resorted to a
process of interpretation to give Hamilton's clients some protection but
disclaimed any general authority to override the legislature and para-
phrased Blackstone's tenth rule:
The supremacy of the Legislature need not be called into question; if
they think fit positively to enact a law, there is no power which can
controul them. When the main object of such a law is clearly ex-
pressed, and the intention manifest, the Judges are not at liberty, al-
though it appears to them to be unreasonable, to reject it: for this
were to set thejudicial above the legislative, which would be subver-
sive of all government.24t
Despite this deference to the Legislature, popular resentment of the
opinion nearly cost the judges their offices and produced angry public
reaction to the idea of judicial control of legislation. 42
235. HAINES, supra note 168, at 94.
236. CROSSKEY, supra note 89, at 943.
237. See generally Goebel, supra note 91, at 125-42; CROSSKEY, supra note 89, at 938-75;
HAINES, supra note 168, at 88-121; see also Law of the Land supra note 129.
238. GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 142.
239. GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 132; 1 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 282-419 (J.
Goebel ed. 1964).
240. 1 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 357 (J. Goebel ed. 1964). Hamilton also
cited The Lord Cromwell's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 13a, 75 Eng. Rep. 877, 880 (K.B. 1557) saying that a
private act "against law and reason" was void.
241. 1 LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 415 (J. Goebel ed. 1964). See also id. at
309.
242. Id. at 312-15. See also Goebel, supra note 91, at 137. Confronted with a hostile public
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Another example is Trevel v. Weeden,243 according to Cooley, "the
first case in which a legislative enactment was declared unconstitu-
tional and void by the courts of a State."2" Rhode Island had adopted
a paper money policy enforced by statutes making it a crime, summa-
rily punishable without jury trial, to refuse to accept the virtually
worthless paper currency to satisfy antecedent debts. The popularity of
the policy was summarized in a jingle:
Bankrupts their creditors with rage pursue;
No stop, no mercy from the debtor crew.
245
The court refused to take jurisdiction of an action against a recalcitrant
butcher, Weeden, who refused to accept paper money. The court
found the denial of jury trial inconsistent with the "law of the land"
clause in the Rhode Island charter. (Rhode Island had not yet adopted
a constitution.) In effect, it held the "Enforcing Act" unconstitutional
without actually declaring it so. This result cost four of the five judges
their offices; the Legislature refused to reelect them.
246
Thayer wrote that the reactions to Trevett v. Weeden and Rutgers v.
Waddington seemed to indicate a public impression "that the change
from colonial dependence to independence had made the legislature
the substitute for Parliament, with a like omnipotence. 247 Crosskey,
whose "eccentric studies""24 must be read with circumspection, mini-
mized the importance of these cases but inferred from others like them
that it is "not to be doubted" they were Tmown to the members of the
Convention of 1787 and that the members would, therefore, have ex-
and a threat of appeal Waddington settled with Mrs. Rutgers and the case was soon "entirely
forgotten." I J. THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 n.l (1895).
243. GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 137-41; CROSSKEY, supra note 89, at 965-68; HAINES, supra
note 168, at 105-12. The case was not reported. The account of it was prepared by James M.
Varnum, defense counsel, and consists mostly of his brief. For references, see HAINES, supra note
168, at 105. Varnum is said to have quoted Coke in Bonham via Bacon's Abridgment. B. Cox,
JUDICIAL POWERS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION 177, 243 (1893).
244. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 26 n.l (1868). Cooley later added Bayard P.
Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787), disallowing a denial of jury trial, as the second holding of
unconstitutionality. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 36 n.1 (5th ed. 1883). Despite his
general disagreement with other writers, Crosskey agrees that Bayard v. Singleton is a "supportive
precedent" for judicial review. CROSSKEY, supra note 89, at 974. Cooley gives an instance of
impeachment of judges in Ohio in 1808 for refusing to enforce an unconstitutional enactment. T.
COOLEY, CONsTrrurIONL LIMITATIONS 194 n.1 (5th ed. 1883).
245. A. NEVINS & H. COMMAGER, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 110 (1956).
246. GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 141; T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 194 n.l (5th
ed. 1883).
247. Thayer, The Origin and Scope f the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 132 (1893). (" This paper is a singularly important piece of American legal scholar-
ship ... " A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 35 (1962).) See also Farrand, The First
Hayburn Case, 1792, 13 AM. HIST. REv. 281, 285 (1908).
248. L. Levy, Judicial Review History and Democracy in JUDGEMENTS, ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 26 (1972). "Most constitutional law experts ... ma series of savage
reviews, condemned Professor Crosskey in the ninth circle of hell." G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 117 n.3 (1977).
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pressly provided for judicial review in the Constitution if they desired
the Supreme Court to have that power.249 But it seems equally argua-
ble that since the power had already been exercised, the members
would have expressly denied it if they desired the Court not to have it.
Although some argumentative reference was made to Bonham's
Case, it should not be over-emphasized. It was but one element "in the
complex corpus of ideas and usages from which a distinctively native
doctrine of control over legislation eventually emerged. ' 250 Bonham's
hold on American constitutional commentary may be due to the pub-
licity James Bradley Thayer gave to Justice Horace Gray's notes in
Quincy's Reports, published in 1865, rather than to demonstrable evi-
dence of its effect in American courts. After all, John Marshall did not
cite Bonham in Marbury v. Madison.251
Marshall's failure to cite Bonham in Marbury can be explained on
the facile ground that Marbury involved a specific provision of the
written constitution, article III, but Bonham involved only a general
unwritten maxim which might not have constitutional significance,
and so Bonham was irrelevant. But this cursory dismissal is not enough
when one considers statements such as "[i]n it [Marbury] the Chief Jus-
tice asserted Coke's theory of judicial supremacy,"25 2 and "Justice
Marshall's concept of the power of judicial review [is] derived from
Lord Coke and Bonham's Case. 253 Counterpoised to these are those
of Sir Henry Maine that the supreme authority of courts in America is
"not only the most interesting but virtually unique creation of the
founds of the Constitution. . . . There is no precedent for it, either in
the ancient or modem world,"25 4 and of Senator Beveridge, Marshall's
"official biographer," that the principle of judicial review "is wholly
and exclusively American. It is America's original contribution to the
science of law." 255 Wherever Marshall got the concept from, it is clear
that he had it well in mind at least fifteen years before Marbury.
Speaking at the Virginia Convention on the adoption of the Constitu-
tion he said on June 20, 1788:
Has the government of the United States power to make laws on
249. CROSSKEY, supra note 91, at 965, 968, 973-74.
250. Goebel, supra note 91, at 93. See also CROSSKEY, supra note 89, at 941. "IThe impor-
tance of Coke, while undeniable, ought not to be exaggerated."
251. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
252. HAINES, supra note 168, at 202.
253. Smith, Marbury v. Madison, Lord Coke and Dr. Bonham: Relics ofthe Past Guidelines/or
the Present-Judicial Review in Transition, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 255, 267 (1979).
254. H. MAINE, POPULAR GOVERNMENT 217 (1886), quoted in HAINES, supra note 168, at 24
n.39. Haines said Maine exaggerated.
255. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 142 (1919) quoted in HOWARD, supra
note 26, at 277. Howard chides Beveridge with overemphasis of exclusivity and originality. How-
ARD, supra note 26, at 277-78.
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every subject?. . . Can they make laws affecting the mode of trans-
ferring property, or contracts or claims, between citizens of the same
state? Can they go beyond the delegated powers? If they were to
make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it
would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Consti-
tution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a law
as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void.25 6
This seems more consonant with an interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause257 than an extrapolation from the natural rights attributed to
Bonham. It is of course true that Kent did laud Coke in Bonham,25s
but this may be an expostfacto rationalization and justification of the
doctrine of judicial review in face of the "rising opposition to the the-
ory of judicial control over legislation." '259 And it is also true that Mar-
shall himself from time to time expressed sentiments in favor of natural
law. But the most that can be said with safety about Bonham and its
associates and progeny is that in substance Coke's theory was more
consistent with Parliamentary supremacy than judicial supremacy; that
Parliamentary supremacy had been radically rejected in America, re-
ally reducing Bonham, which had no radical overtones, to "dead wood
on both sides of the Atlantic;"26 and that the American view may well
be an indigenous hybrid of a variety of elements of American political
thought, some of which originated elsewhere and all uniquely com-
pounded here.26'
256. 3 J. ELLIoT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 553 (2d ed. 1836-45).
Marshall has been accused of using Marbury to vindicate his own political ideas, HAINES, supra
note 168, at 199-203, and of begging the question "who should be empowered to decide that the
act is repugnant, Congress or the Court?" A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 3 (1962);
and with an act of "usurpation," id. at 15.
257. See, e.g., Goebel, supra note 91, at 241; "The effect of this [the Supremacy Clause] was to
place beyond question the role of the Supreme Court as arbiter of the Constitution." A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 15 (1962):
[I]t is as clear as such matters can be that the Framers of the Constitution specifically, if
tacitly, expected that the federal courts would assume a power--of whatever exact
dimensions--to pass on the constitutionality of actions of the Congress and the Presi-
dent, as well as of the several states.
St. George Tucker relied on the status of the state constitution as "the supreme law of the land" to
sustain the institution ofjudicial review in Virginia. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) 20, 79
(1793).
258. See generally I J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 420 (1826). Gray thought
Kent praised "a boldness Coke never assumed." Quincy (Mass.), Appendix I at 524 n.23 (1865).
259. HAINES, su.pra note 168, at 202 and 232passim.
260. See SMITH, supra note 89, at 492. But see SMITH, supra note 89, at 358.
261. For an example of the express rejection of legislative omnipotence and rejection of the
analogy to Parliament, see Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 48 (Henry, J.), 60 (Tyler,
J.), (1793). Tucker, J., called the idea that the legislature was the sole judge of the constitutionality
of its acts a "sophism [which] could never have obtained a moment's credit with the world, had
such a thing as a written Constitution existed before the American revolution." Id. at 77. For
Tucker's repudiation of Blackstone's theory of sovereignity in Parliament rather than in the peo-
ple, see Cover, Book Review, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1477-79 (1970). See note 170 supra. Bon.
ham's Case is not cited in Kaaper v. Hawkins, a circumstance supporting the inference that
judicial review was a newly created rather than a derived institution.
1981 / "Interprelation" of "Due Process of Law"
CONCLUSION: ANTICIPATING MORE ON THE STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The institution of judicial review was not accepted without question.
In Vermont it was denounced as "anti-republican," and in Ohio in
1808 judges were impeached for holding legislative acts unconstitu-
tional.262 As late as 1825, John Bannister Gibson, whom Roscoe
Pound considered one of our ten greatest judges, 263 wrote in dissent, "It
is the business of the judiciary to interpret the laws, not scan the au-
thority of the lawgiver." 2" But Gibson succumbed to the course of
events and twenty years later changed his opinion. 265 Like it or not, the
institution is with us, and arguments over its legitimacy, no matter how
ingenious or historically supportable, are academic and tangential to
the issue at hand, which is not the authority to exercise the power but
the development of the standards to be followed in its exercise. On the
latter point there is suprisingly little discussion. As late as 1979, Raoul
Berger wrote that the pre-1787 cases "have never been examined for
their due process implications." 266 Berger then examined some prece-
dents both before and after 1787 and concluded that the extended use
of either "law of the land" or "due process of law" is historically un-
supportable. In his vigorous terms, "by dint of repetition, what was
manifest Uudicial] usurpation became clothed in respectability. '267 In
a future essay I hope to review some of those same cases to show how
this respectability was achieved.
262. Thayer, The Origin and Scope ofthe-American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 133-34 (1893).
263. See B. SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 76-77 (1974). Gibson was very versatile. "He
was probably the only major judge who designed his own false teeth." L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 120 (1973).
264. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & RawL 330 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting). See generally
HAINES, supra note 168, at 272-84.
265. See Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 281 (1845). "The late [Constitutional] Convention by
their silence sanctioned the pretensions of the courts to deal freely with the acts of the legisla-
ture ... . "
266. Law of the Land, supra note 129, at 2.
267. Law of the Land, supra note 129, at 30.

